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The fight against tax fraud in Hungary 
Tax fraud is a negative concomitant phenomenon known for a long time of most 
human societies. Where a tax system works, tax fraud occurs, since this 
category was defined by Platon 2500 years ago.' The rate of the tax fraud might 
be affected by several social, legal, and economical factor, such as the 
complexity of the tax system, the extent of tax burden, the wasteful 
appropriation of public funds, the lack of legitimacy of the ruling class, the 
corrupt operation of the tax administration, or the extent of black market.' The 
inclination of compliance of the taxpayers shows different characteristics in 
every state, because taxation, as well as the system and operation of the tax 
system are culturally determined. The Hungarian fight against tax fraud might 
be also instructive for the countries having a changing economical and social 
structure. In Hungary, tax fraud existed only in a rather vestigial form during 
the socialist times, because there was not an operating general tax system that 
covered all the natural persons and legal persons and all contracts. There were 
only a few private enterprises and undertakings, who were burdened with 
individually levied taxes, and the companies of the state sector fulfilled their 
budgetary payments according to unique tax assessment. The economical 
changes that enforced the market mechanisms and the establishment of the 
developed tax system began before the political changes that altered the 
Hungarian society in 1990. As a result of the first stage of the privatization that 
began in 1987, the private enterprises and undertakings could appear.' Their 
existence and operation enforced the radical reform of the structure of the public 
funds and the monetary system.' The two-tier banking system, in the center with 
the Hungarian National Bank (Magyar Nemzeti Bank, MNB), and on the lower 
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level with the commercial banks and financial institutions that were able to 
finance the development needs of the shaping private sector. In that situation, 
the development of the modern tax system became a significant priority. This 
economical and social pressure extorted the establishment of the tax system in 
1986-1987 among the socialist countries for the first time. Hungary, being 
ahead with 8 to 10 years among most of the surrounding countries, issued and 
introduced the value added tax, the corporate taxation, and the taxation of 
natural persons on 1 January 1988. These changes shocked the people, despite 
that the government tried to compensate the loss of the income derived from the 
new taxes, and also tried to make the people prepared for the operation of the 
new types of taxes. The taxpayers, so the people, understood hardly their new 
obligations, since they did not have any knowledge of taxation. As Hungarian 
taxpayers did not have any experience related to taxation for 50 years, these 
cyclic obligations (for instance tax return, tax prepayment, VAT assessment) in 
considerable changed their lives of the taxpayers. The establishment of the 
Hungarian revenue office in 1987 was not supported by a legal regulation of 
taxation, containing detailed instructions, and this caused further difficulty. This 
came into force only in 1991 via the Act XCI of 1990. 
The main characteristics of the Hungarian tax system from its establishment 
were the complexity, the low level of taxation knowledge and awareness, and 
the high rate of withdrawal compared to incomes. According to certain 
estimations, the amount of untaxed income in Hungary reached 50 billion HUF 
in 1990, so 7.8% of the tax and customs revenues, meaning 2.4% of the GDP.' 
According to other researchers, the ratio of the untaxed incomes at the 
beginning of the 90's had been doubled until the middle of the decade. In 
Hungary the magnitude of the hidden-untaxed economy reached 20% of the 
GDP in 1988, then, in 1990, 1.3% of the GDP. According to two co-authors 
(Harsányiné — Fritzné), in this period 17-25% of the annual expense of the 
Hungarian families, altogether about 3.5-4 billion USD was realized in the 
black market. Others (e.g. Sík 2000, J. Semlyén — Tóth 2004) believe that, 
parallel with the economic growth, the decrease of the attractiveness and rate of 
the hidden economy in the national economy could be experienced between 
1998 and 2000, due to the increasing incomes and the increasing economic 
importance of the large multinational and medium-sized companies within the 
entire economy. 6 The number of taxpayers increased dramatically, and making 
the work of the tax authorities even more difficult In 1988, before the political 
changes, there were 394,053 registered taxpayers; and eight years later (in 
1996) this number grew to its tenfold, to 3,876,620. However, the staff increase 
of the tax office workers did not follow the increasing number of taxpayers: 
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even in 2000 the tax authorities had less than 15,000 hired employees. 
Additionally, in the 90's the internal migration of labor within the tax authority 
was incredibly high, having the estimated extend of 8-10%. The continously 
changing, inexperienced and underpaid apparatus time could have demolished 
the effectiveness of the best tax legislation as well. However, the situation on 
the area of tax legislation was not good either, since Hungarian tax legislation 
made voluntary tax compliance more difficult, due to its continous changes. It 
was a big default of the Hungarian parliament that the tax norms formed in a 
period of political changes, did not react on the problems related to tax 
compliance, because these problems were considered as only temporary 
phenomena that will disappear if the real market conditions develop. However, 
reality disproved this approach. The famous jurist, Gábor Földes, when 
examining the tax administration of the 90's, found out that the instruments of 
the Hungarian law against tax evasion are primitive. This situation has been 
changed in the 90's by the enforcement of the principle of `content prior to the 
form' included in the act on the rules of taxation, and the definition of the 
requirement of the principle of good faith. 
The criminal regulation of taxation 
One of the characteristics of the struggle against tax fraud in Hungary is that 
both the tax authorities and the criminal law tries to take a stand against it on 
two separate levels. On one hand the tax authorities defined in Article 10 of Act 
XCII. of 2003, can proceed during the inquiry of the taxation discipline.' Four 
tax authorities operate presently In Hungary with separate powers. These are the 
tax and financial control administration, the customs and finance guard, the 
county and metropolitan duties offices, and, regarding to local taxes, the clerks 
of the local governments. Chapter 6 of the referred act defines precisely the 
rules of the competence and power. The state tax authority (Hungarian Tax and 
Financial Control Administration, Adó- és Pénzügyi Ellenőrzési Hivatal, 
APEH) proceeds in cases related to tax, claiming tax refund, budgetary 
subsidies, and other public debts to be collected the same way as taxes. The 
second tax authority, the customs and finance guard shall proceed primarily in 
cases in respect of customs, registration duties, excise taxation, and taxation of 
imported products. The municipal tax authority proceeds in respect of cases in 
connection with local taxes, motor vehicle tax, and taxation of income derived 
from arable land lease. The fourth tax authority consists of the county and 
metropolitan revenue offices (altogether 20) that proceed regarding duties on 
transfer of property. It is typical for the taxation related work of the APEH and 
the customs and finance guard that their task is not investigation work, but 
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focusing on the taxation documents related to the public payment obligations 
they analyze whether the taxpayer fulfills his tax liability, and if yes then by 
what means. There audit is focusing mainly on the formal fulfillment, and they 
proceed in case of misdemeanors of lesser degree (late fulfillment, failure of 
fulfilling the obligation of issuing an invoice, etc.). In the operative Hungarian 
system, the tax administration also has an independent system of sanctions that 
is separated from criminal law. These are itemized one by one by the act's 
chapter 8 called legal consequences. The chapter in question mentions default 
penalty, self-revision surcharge, tax penalty, default fine, and the "measures" 
(e.g. confiscation, closing of premises). However, these sanctions are not 
criminal sanctions, but sanctions of tax law that are established by the authority 
in a resolution. These legal consequences might be applied only in case of 
misdemeanors of lesser degree, but can not be applied in case of more serious 
misdemeanors. The more serious violation of law is reported by the Hungarian 
Tax and Financial Control Administration (APEH) or the Hungarian customs 
and finance guard, so these authorities pass the case to the investigating bodies 
(the police and the public prosecutor's office) proceeding in criminal law cases. 
The criminal procedure, so the second level of the struggle against tax fraud, 
starts at this point. Any person is subject to Article 310 of the Hungarian 
Criminal Code (Act IV of 1978), who, in front of the authority, declares false or 
conceals fact (data) that is important regarding to the tax liability, and with this 
or other misleading conduct reduces the extent of the tax revenue, so commits 
misdemeanor, is guilty of tax fraud. The punishment is 3 years of imprisonment 
because of felonious tort, if the tax revenue decreases significantly due to the 
crime. This statutory provision was extended in 1997 by the legislator to the 
social security contribution and the superannuation tax as well. This means that 
in Hungary tax fraud may be committed not just on the harm of the narrowly 
defined taxes, but of other public debts as well. The number of the transpired 
tax frauds was around 200 cases a year in the beginning of the 90's, that 
increased up to 480 in 1993, and 953 until 1997. In 1998 more than 5000 cases 
became known, and this number changed to 1731 in 1999. The considerable 
increase of 1998 appeared because the special investigating and crime 
preventing body of the revenue office commenced its operation. This body, 
having large investigating powers, could conduct an effective reconnoitering 
work. Unfortunately this organization was abolished in 2000. 8 
By studying the forms of the criminal conduct of tax fraud, it can be stated 
that the type of the committed crimes changed significantly in the last 15 years. 
Such a criminal class came into existence in the beginning of the 90's that 
conducted its illegal activities in an organized manner, by following the 
changing of the tax, customs, foreign exchange, and axcise regulations, using 
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excellent experts, and sometimes infiltrating into the political system and public 
administration.' 
Between 1988 and 2002, during the first years of the Hungarian tax system, 
only a couple of dozen crimes occurred, and these were related to taxation of 
lower importance. The turning point came with the Act LXXIV of 1992 that 
regulated the VAT refund comprehensively. A new criminal conduct was 
specified as applying for VAT refund after a fictious invoice by establishing 
fictive enterprises. This conduct was qualified by the court order no. 1993/218 
simply as fraud, so not as tax fraud, in which the illegitimate application for 
VAT refund was established. Another typical form of commission was the 
following: a not registered enterprise applied for postponed customs allowance 
with false data, then imported oil products in a huge quantity, and did not pay 
the related fees (e.g. customs, sales tax, VAT, excises, duties). After 
immediately having sold these products, the owners (shareholders) and 
employees of the company disappeared, obviously without paying the public 
debts later either. In this period no excise code or customs code existed in 
Hungary, and there was no provisions against money laundering in force either, 
and this supported the commitment of the above referred crimes. Due to the 
inaccurate regulation of the excise act that came into effect in 1993, in the 
middle of the 90's the organized criminals became interested in excise goods 
again, and they took advantage of the legal situation that the oil used for the 
motor vehicles could be also used for heating and was available for the people 
for a much lower price. The significant difference between the price of the 
diesel oil and the volume of tax of the heating oil offered an extremely huge 
profit for the organized crime. Several hundred thousand tons of diesel oil were 
bought as heating oil by farmers, contractors, and carriers, but also by 
municipalities, and in some cases by the military and the ambulance as well. In 
order to cover these activities, so-called `invoice factories' appeared in 1994, 
covering the illegal sale by issuing fictitious invoices. According to the experts, 
between 1995 and 1996, in the heyday of the oil counterfeit and oil fraud, the 
Hungarian state suffered a damage of several billion HUF. The number of the 
investigated misuse of excise was 396 in 1995, 447 in 1996, and was decreased 
to 10 cases in 1997. Due to the organized and effective measures of the 
authorities, the criminals had to look for another area of crime after 1996. 
Therefore, based on the storage capacity of the oil counterfeit, the crime altered, 
and by violating the rules and provisions of the excise act, wine counterfeit 
started when a beverage similar to wine but of a poor quality was produced 
from artificial and other materials, without using fruits, therefore it being 
harmful to health as well. The vestigial forms of this criminal activity may be 
experienced nowadays as well. The target of the criminals of Hungarian tax 
fraud changed completely after Hungary joined the European Union in 2004, 
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and the number of tax fraud decreased accordingly. Although fictitious 
invoicing and sales without an invoice have not ended, but, because of the 
improving technological system of records, now it is more difficult to operate 
systems subject to tax evasion. However, the smuggling (illegal importation) of 
excise goods to the European Union via Hungary has risen, focusing 
particularly on tobacco and alcoholic products. 
To sum up, it can be stated that the Hungarian taxation experience of the 
last 15 years is that the improving living conditions, the measures against 
money laundering, the continual tax-cuts, and the improvement of the standards 
of the tax administration can be used together more effectively against the 
phenomena of tax fraud and black market, than criminal law could react alone. 
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SZILOVICS CSABA 
AZ ADÓCSALÁS ELLENI KÜZDELEM MAGYARORSZÁGON 
(Összefoglalás) 
Az adócsalás több mint 2500 éves jelenség, amely minden állam kisérő 
jelensége, ahol bármifajta adóztatás működik. A magyarországi adócsalás elleni 
küzdelem rendszerváltás utáni korszakát vizsgálva megállapítható, hogy az 
1990-es évek elején sem a közigazgatás, sem a politika nem fordított kiemelt 
figyelmet e feladatra, úgy vélték ez csupán a piacgazdaság kialakulásához 
kapcsolódó átmeneti probléma. Az 1987-ben beinduló privatizáció és a jogi 
háttér átalakulása modern adórendszer kialakulása egy jól felépített 
adóigazgatást igényelt volna. Ennek ellenére az első adóigazgatás rendjéről 
szóló 1990. évi XCI. törvény az adóreformokat követően három évvel jelent 
meg. A jelentős mértékű fekete gazdaság, az olajszőkítés, a csökkenő állami 
bevételek és az adózók növekvő száma a 90-es évek közepén ráirányította a 
figyelmet az adóigazgatás hatékonyságának problémájára és az adócsalás elleni 
küzdelemre. A büntető törvénykönyv is reagált ezekre a kihívásokra és a Btk. 
310. §-a meghatározta az adócsalás fogalmát. Ezzel egy időben megszülettek 
azok az alapvető törvények, mint a jelenleg is hatályos áfa és szja törvény, 
valamint megszületett az első jövedéki törvény és az évtized végére az 
adóigazgatás alapelvei közé olyan új elemek kerültek be, mint a szerződések 
tartalom szerinti elbírálása. A hatékonyabb jogalkotás és az 1998-ban 
létrehozott speciális adónyomozó szervezet munkájának hatására az adócsalás 
jelensége nem szűnt meg, csupán átalakult, e bűncselekmény elkövetői egyre 
felkészültebbé és szervezettebbé váltak, és az általuk okozo tt károk nagysága 
jelentős mértékben napjainkra sem csökkent. A 2003. évi erőteljes jogalkotási 
hullámban új jövedéki, vám- és adóigazgatási törvények születtek és 
szigorították a közpénzek felhasználásának rendszerét is. Ennek ellenére az 
adócsalás és a feketegazdaság nagyságrendje érzékelhetően nem csökkent és 
ugyanúgy kihívást jelent napjainkban az adóigazgatás és a politika számára, 
mint a rendszerváltás időszakában. 
